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DISTORTING EXTORTION: HOW BRIBERY AND 
EXTORTION BECAME ONE AND THE SAME 
UNDER THE HOBBS ACT 
Sigourney Haylock* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Ocasio v. United States,1 the Supreme Court grappled with the 
issue of whether a public official can be found guilty of conspiring to 
commit extortion under the Hobbs Act for agreeing to obtain money 
from his co-conspirators.2 Perplexingly, the Court held that, indeed, 
an extortionist is guilty of conspiring to commit Hobbs Act extortion 
even if the person he extorts is a willing participant in the conspiracy.3 
This Comment argues that Ocasio was wrongly decided based on a 
blurred distinction between bribery and extortion. Sections II and III 
of this Comment provide background by describing the facts of the 
case and explaining the Court’s reasoning. Section IV puts Ocasio in 
context by discussing the historical framework of the Hobbs Act. 
Section V provides an analysis of the Court’s interpretation of the 
plain language of the Hobbs Act, the distinction between bribery and 
extortion, and how the Court’s holding perpetuates issues of state 
sovereignty and prosecutorial overreach. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Samuel Ocasio, a former police officer, participated in a kickback 
scheme in which he and other officers in the Baltimore Police 
Department (“BPD”) directed damaged vehicles from accident scenes 
to a repair shop called Majestic Auto Repair (“Majestic”) in exchange 
for payments.4 Approximately sixty officers in the BPD sent damaged 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Environmental 
Studies, 2012, University of California, Santa Barbara. 
 1. 136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016). 
 2. Id. at 1429. 
 3. Id. at 1427. 
 4. Id. at 1427. 
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cars to Majestic in exchange for $150 to $300 per referral.5 Before 
sending a car to Majestic, Ocasio would call the shop owners from the 
accident scene to verify the make and model of the car, the damage, 
and the car’s insurance coverage in order to ensure profitability.6 
Ocasio participated in the scheme from 2009 to 2011,7 and by early 
2011 nearly ninety percent of Majestic’s customers came directly from 
officers at the BPD.8 Later that year, the shop owners, Ocasio, and 
nine other police officers were indicted on charges of Hobbs Act 
extortion and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion.9 
Ocasio challenged the conspiracy conviction, arguing that he 
could not be convicted of conspiring with the shop owners to extort 
money from the very same shop owners.10 He requested a jury 
instruction that stated, “[i]n order to convict a defendant of conspiracy 
to commit extortion under color of official right, the government must 
prove . . . that the conspiracy was to obtain money or property from 
some person who was not a member of the conspiracy.”11 The trial 
court refused to give the proposed instruction.12 
Ultimately, the District Court for the District of Maryland 
convicted Ocasio of Hobbs Act extortion and conspiracy to commit 
Hobbs Act extortion13 and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.14 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and likewise affirmed Ocasio’s conviction.15 
III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
Ocasio was convicted under the general federal conspiracy 
statute, which makes it a crime to “conspire . . . to commit any offense 
against the United States.”16 The Court defined the underlying offense 
as extortion under the Hobbs Act, which prohibits the “obtaining of 
property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of 
actual or threatened force, violence or fear, or under color of official 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 1428. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 1429. 
 11. Id. at 1428. 
 12. Id. 
 13. United States v. Ocasio, No. CCB-1-11-CR-00122-013, 2012 WL 12092056, at *1 
(D. Md. July 23, 2012). 
 14. United States v. Ocasio, 750 F.3d 399, 401 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 15. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1423. 
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). 
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right.”17 The phrase “under color of official right” refers to a public 
official or employee who uses the power and authority of his or her 
office to obtain money, property, or something of value to which he or 
she has no official right from another.18 
The Court relied heavily on an in-depth analysis of traditional 
conspiracy law, perhaps at the expense of a thorough analysis of the 
distinction between extortion and bribery. According to the Court, in 
order to establish Ocasio’s Hobbs Act conspiracy, the Government 
only needed to prove that there was an agreement for any one of the 
conspirators to commit each element of the substantive offense.19 In 
other words, a conspirator simply had to agree that the underlying 
offense be committed by at least one member of the conspiracy 
capable of committing it.20 
Ocasio’s main argument was that the shop owners could not be 
members of a conspiracy to commit extortion when they willingly 
consented to pay the officers in exchange for referrals.21 He argued 
that this was not extortion, but rather bribery.22 The Court disagreed, 
holding that, although they could not extort themselves, the shop 
owners were capable of conspiring with the officers to be extorted.23 
The Court found that the elements of the conspiracy were satisfied 
because the officers were capable of extorting “another,” even though 
the other party was a part of the conspiracy.24 
The Court based its reasoning on cases involving the Mann Act,25 
which makes it a crime to transport a woman or cause her to be 
transported across state lines for an immoral purpose.26 For example, 
the Court discussed United States v. Holte27 in which a woman was 
charged for conspiring with a man to transport herself across state 
lines.28 The trial court dismissed the charge holding that, because a 
woman could not be convicted for the substantive offense of 
 
 17. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012). 
 18. KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET. AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL 
§ 53:09 (6th ed. 2015). 
 19. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1429. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1433–34. 
 22. Id. at 1434. 
 23. Id. at 1432. 
 24. Id. 
 25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–24 (2015). 
 26. Id.; Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1430. 
 27. 236 U.S. 140 (1915). 
 28. Id. at 140. 
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transporting herself or causing herself to be transported across state 
lines, she also could not be convicted of conspiring to commit the 
offense.29 The Supreme Court rejected that holding, stating that “a 
person may conspire for the commission of a crime by a third person,” 
even if “she could not commit the substantive crime” herself.30 
Similarly, in Gebardi v. United States,31 a man and woman were 
convicted of conspiring to transport the woman from one state to 
another for an immoral purpose.32 The Supreme Court stated that 
“[i]ncapacity of one to commit the substantive offense does not 
necessarily imply that he may with impunity conspire with others who 
are able to commit it.”33 Like in Holte, the Court agreed that a woman 
could be convicted of conspiring to cause herself to be transported 
across state lines.34 However, in Gebardi the woman’s “mere consent” 
or “acquiescence” was not enough to support the conspiracy 
convictions because she was not “the active or moving spirit in 
conceiving or carrying out the transportation.”35 These cases show that 
one can be guilty of conspiring to commit a crime even when they are 
incapable of actually committing the crime. 
Applying this reasoning to Ocasio, the Court held that, even 
though the shop owners could not commit each element of the offense 
on their own, the elements of the crime were satisfied because the shop 
owners shared the common purpose that the officers would obtain 
money from another under color of official right.36 The Court reasoned 
that if a woman can conspire to transport herself, then conspirators can 
conspire to extort themselves.37 Although the shop owners were 
incapable of extorting themselves on their own, they were capable of 
conspiring with others to be extorted.38 Based on this reasoning, the 
Supreme Court rejected Ocasio’s arguments and affirmed his 
conviction.39 
 
 29. Id. at 141. 
 30. Id. at 144–45. 
 31. 287 U.S. 112 (1932). 
 32. Id. at 115–16. 
 33. Id. at 120. 
 34. Id. at 116–17. 
 35. Id. at 119. 
 36. Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1433 (2016). 
 37. See id. at 1431–32. 
 38. Id. at 1433–34. 
 39. Id. at 1437. 
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IV.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  The Hobbs Act 
The Hobbs Act was enacted in 1946 to help the government 
combat racketeering associated with organized crime.40 The Act 
prohibits actual or attempted robbery, extortion, or conspiracy that 
affects interstate commerce.41 As noted above, it defines extortion as, 
“the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by 
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under 
color of official right.”42 Victims of extortion must be induced by a 
belief that the defendant has the power to harm them or cause 
economic loss.43 The crux of the offense is a subjective fear of loss by 
the victim.44 
While this is the traditional understanding of extortion, the 
Supreme Court has since expanded the meaning of Hobbs Act 
extortion to include bribery. 
B.  Equating Extortion with Bribery 
The language of the Hobbs Act plainly lacks the term bribery.45 
However, the Court in Evans v. United States46 held that extortion by 
a public official was “the rough equivalent” of “taking a bribe.”47 In 
Evans, a county commissioner was convicted of extortion under color 
of official right for accepting money in exchange for a favorable 
zoning decision.48 The Court held that it was enough that a public 
official had accepted a payment knowing that it was given in exchange 
for some exercise of official power,49 and Evans’s conviction for 
Hobbs Act extortion was affirmed.50 The Court in Evans decided that 
 
 40. United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 377 (1978). 
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012); United States v. Baylor, 517 F.3d 899, 903 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 42. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012). 
 43. See, e.g., United States v. Capo, 817 F.2d 947, 954 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the 
evidence was insufficient for a finding of Hobbs Act extortion where the “victims” were not 
coerced or threatened by defendants and did not reasonably fear economic loss). 
 44. Extortion is based on the wrongful use of an otherwise valid power. United States v. Hyde, 
448 F.2d 815, 833 (5th Cir. 1971). If the power is used to intimidate and force others to pay, the 
action is extortion. Id. 
 45. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012). 
 46. 504 U.S. 255 (1992). 
 47. Id. at 260. 
 48. Id. at 296 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 268. 
 50. Id. at 255. 
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even “passive acceptance” of a bribe by a public official can violate 
the Hobbs Act and eliminated the inducement element of extortion.51 
Other cases have similarly held that bribery and extortion are not 
mutually exclusive.52 
Prior to Evans, federal prosecutors were unable to reach state and 
local officials through the federal bribery statute.53 Since the Court 
equated extortion with bribery,54 state officials who accept bribes can 
be charged with federal extortion under color of official right even if 
the briber is a co-conspirator that was in no way induced by a 
subjective fear of loss.55 Evans paved the way for the holding in 
Ocasio by incorrectly equating extortion with bribery. 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The plain language of the Hobbs Act does not indicate that 
Congress intended to punish the type of agreement made between 
Ocasio and the shop owners for two main reasons.56 First, the officers 
did not obtain property from “another.” Rather, they agreed to an 
exchange of money and favors amongst themselves. Second, the 
officers did not use force or wrongfully use color of official right to 
induce or initiate an exchange of property. Instead, the shop owners 
willingly agreed to enter into a mutual agreement with the officers. 
 
 51. Id. at 258–59. 
 52. Many courts have convicted public officials of Hobbs Act extortion in the absence of any 
inducement on the part of the public official or fear on the part of the alleged victim. See, e.g., 
United States v. Stephenson, 895 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding Hobbs Act extortion where an 
official in the Department of Commerce accepted payments to influence a ruling); United States v. 
Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding Hobbs Act extortion where a state highway 
administrator accepted money from a road building contractor in exchange for favors); United 
States v. Wright, 797 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987) (finding Hobbs 
Act extortion where city prosecutors accepted money for not prosecuting drunk drivers). 
 53. The federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012), generally applies only to federal public 
officials; federal prosecutors pursuing bribery on the state and local level must use a different 
theory. Randall Eliason, Ocasio v. United States: The Supreme Court Confronts the Blurred Line 
between Bribery and Extortion, SIDEBARS, (Oct. 19, 2015) https://rdeliason.com/20 
15/10/19/ocasio-supreme-court-bribery-extortion-hobbs. 
 54. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1437 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 55. Rory Little, Opinion Analysis: Federal Conspiracy Law Reaches Persons Who Agree to 
Obtain Secret Kickbacks from a Member of the Conspiracy, SCOTUSBLOG (May 2, 2016, 
5:33 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/05/opinion-analysis-federal-conspiracy-law-reaches-
persons-who-agree-to-obtain-secret-kickbacks-from-a-member-of-the-conspiracy. 
 56. The statute plainly discusses robbery and extortion, but does not include bribery. If 
Congress intended to include bribery of a public official in the Hobbs Act, then it would have done 
so. For example, in the Travel Act, Congress explicitly criminalized state and local “extortion, 
bribery, [and] arson.” 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012). Congress tellingly left bribery out of the Hobbs 
Act. 
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These two arguments are discussed in turn below. They are followed 
by an analysis of the implications of the holding in Ocasio as it 
pertains to state sovereignty and prosecutorial overreach. 
A.  Defining “Another” 
The plain language of the Hobbs Act requires that property be 
taken from “another,” not from someone within the conspiracy.57 Yet, 
the Government argued, and the Court agreed, that a conspiracy to 
obtain property from another includes an agreement between two 
parties to exchange property between themselves.58 This unnatural 
reading of the Hobbs Act adds to the blurring of the distinction 
between extortion and bribery. 
The majority largely based its reasoning on an analysis of the 
Mann Act.59 However, as Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent, the 
language of the Mann Act does not compare to the language in the 
Hobbs Act.60 Unlike the Hobbs Act, which requires “another” person, 
the Mann Act pertains to the transportation of “any woman.”61 A 
conspiracy to agree to transport “any woman,” in violation of the 
Mann Act, naturally includes any woman who is a part of the 
conspiracy.62 The same cannot be said of the Hobbs Act’s specific 
requirement that the conspirators as a whole agree to obtain property 
from “another.”63 
Justice Sotomayor further explained that “any” is not a relational 
word that requires a determination of who is in a group and who is not, 
whereas the term “another” does.64 “Another” describes how one 
entity is connected to a different entity that must be “different or 
distinct from the one first considered.”65 A conspiracy is “a 
partnership in crime,” so the law treats a conspiracy as one distinct 
entity.66 As a whole, the conspirators must seek to obtain property 
from a distinct entity to satisfy the meaning of “another.”67 Simply 
 
 57. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012). 
 58. See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1426. 
 59. Id. at 1442–43 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. at 1443. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1441; Another, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). 
 66. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1441–42 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 67. Id. at 1442. 
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stated, at least one member of the group must seek to obtain property 
from someone who is not a part of the group.68 
Applying this understanding of the Hobbs Act, the Sixth Circuit 
in United States v. Brock69 held that “three people did not agree, and 
could not have agreed, to obtain property from ‘another’ when no 
other person was involved.”70 In Brock, the defendants were also 
convicted of conspiring to commit Hobbs Act extortion where the 
underlying conduct was more akin to bribery.71 The Sixth Circuit held 
that the person paying a bribe to a state official could not conspire with 
that official to extort property from himself in violation of the Hobbs 
Act.72 This is the most logical application of the plain language in the 
act, yet the Supreme Court, consistent with the reasoning in Evans, 
abrogated Brock.73 
Similar to the conspirators in Brock, the conspirators in Ocasio 
agreed that the officers would take property from people who were 
part of the conspiracy.74 There is no question that the shop owners in 
Ocasio were conspirators involved in the scheme as opposed to 
“another” being extorted by the officers. Although the law treats a 
conspiracy as one distinct entity, the Supreme Court decided that 
“another” could be determined from the perspective of each individual 
within the conspiracy.75 This means that any one conspirator can be 
considered “another” despite being a part of the very same conspiracy. 
This interpretation of the language in the Hobbs Act has resulted in 
illogical holdings such as the one in Ocasio and will continue to do so 
until Evans is overturned. 
B.  Distorting Extortion 
The Court has unilaterally read bribery into the meaning of the 
Hobbs Act. Bribery and extortion are distinct crimes and the 
majority’s decision in Ocasio perpetuates the elimination of the 
distinction under the Hobbs Act.76 The main difference between 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. 501 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 70. Id. at 767. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 764. 
 73. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1423. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1442 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. at 1439 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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bribery and extortion is the role of each party. Extortion requires 
initiative or purpose on the part of the public official and fear or lack 
of voluntariness from the victim.77 With extortion, the public official 
is the only offender and the payor is an innocent victim.78 The person 
who pays the public official is not considered a willing participant of 
a corrupt deal.79 On the other hand, with bribery, the public official 
does not need to feign a right or entitlement because the payor knows 
the official is not entitled to the payment.80 With a bribe, both sides of 
the transaction are guilty parties to a corrupt deal.81 
This distinction is problematic because the Hobbs Act does not 
prohibit a victim’s payment of extortion; it only punishes the public 
official.82 By equating extortion with bribery, the Court in Evans 
created a prohibition on bribery, a crime involving two guilty parties, 
based on a portion of a statute that only punishes the public official.83 
The Supreme Court has essentially carved out an exception that allows 
federal prosecutors to charge state and local officials with conspiracy 
to commit Hobbs Act extortion in the absence of any actual 
extortion.84 
In Ocasio, the owners of Majestic were not victims. Not only 
were they complicit in the scheme, they greatly benefited from it as 
ninety percent of Majestic’s business came directly from police 
referrals.85 The agreement was mutually beneficial and collaborative 
with no inducement or fear.86 As such, Ocasio was not guilty of 
conspiring to commit extortion; rather, he was guilty of conspiring to 
engage in bribery, which the Hobbs Act does not explicitly target. 
Conspiracy has been criticized as a “vague and elastic” charge 
that fits a prosecutor’s needs in any given case.87 The Court has 
 
 77. United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 833 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 78. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1438 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 79. Randall Eliason, Extortion Distortion: Ocasio v. United States, SIDEBARS (May 12, 2016), 
https://rdeliason.com/2016/05/12/extortion-distortion-supreme-court-hobbs-ocasio-v-united-
states. 
 80. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1438 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 81. Eliason, supra note 79. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411, 419 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding Hobbs Act 
extortion where appellants were passive recipients of bribes with no inducement or initiation of 
transfer of payment). 
 85. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1438–39. 
 86. Id. at 1427. 
 87. Id. at 1445–46 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Krulewitch v. United States, 
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cautioned that it “will view with disfavor attempts to broaden the 
already pervasive and wide-sweeping nets of conspiracy 
prosecutions.”88 Yet, it failed to do so in Ocasio. 
To the extent the Court relied on traditional conspiracy law, it was 
correct in concluding that Ocasio entered into a conspiracy to commit 
a crime. However, the underlying crime was not extortion. The Court 
thoroughly analyzed traditional conspiracy law and failed to 
adequately address the distinction between extortion and bribery. 
Instead, it relied on its flawed reasoning in Evans, which has resulted 
in the notion that public officials “exude an aura of coercion at all 
places and at all times,” simply by virtue of their title.89 
The Court could have used the general principles of conspiracy 
law to come to the correct conclusion if Ocasio had been charged with 
conspiracy to commit the proper underlying crime. There are other 
criminal statutes that reach the conduct at issue here.90 Hobbs Act 
extortion is meant to prohibit public officials from obtaining property 
from others by extorting them. While bribery is certainly prohibited 
by law, the Hobbs Act is not the proper avenue by which to pursue 
such charges. Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Hobbs 
Act, state and local officials can be convicted of Hobbs Act extortion 
with the potential for a twenty-year prison sentence for taking a bribe. 
C.  Prosecutorial Overreach 
The Hobbs Act provides an avenue for the expansion of federal 
criminal jurisdiction into a field traditionally left to state and local 
laws.91 The Court briefly noted that Ocasio’s invocation of principles 
of federalism was unavailing, yet it did not cite any authority justifying 
the intrusion on state bribery laws.92 The holding in Ocasio challenges 
state sovereignty and encourages federal prosecutorial overreach. 
The Supreme Court has stated, “[u]nless Congress conveys its 
purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed 
 
336 U.S. 440, 445–57 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 88. Id. at 1445 (citing Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404 (1957)). 
 89. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 290 (1992). 
 90. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012) (criminalizing bribery of state, local, or tribal officials in 
specified circumstances); MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-201 (West 2012) (criminalizing 
bribery of public employees). 
 91. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1434. 
 92. Id. 
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the federal-state balance in the prosecution of crimes.”93 Congress 
failed to make its intent for federal prosecutors to regulate bribery by 
state and local officials “unmistakably clear in the language of the” 
Hobbs Act.94 Instead, Congress’s intention was arguably the opposite, 
as it did not include bribery in the statute.95 When Congress wants to 
criminalize state and local bribery, it knows how to do so.96 If 
Congress intended to criminalize parties to a bribe under the Hobbs 
Act, then it would have done so explicitly.97 
The lack of congressional intent is further evidenced by the fact 
that the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, only applies a two-
year penalty for bribery committed by federal officials98 while the 
Hobbs Act carries a significantly higher twenty-year penalty.99 It is 
unlikely that Congress intended for such a heavy penalty to apply to 
state and local bribery when it only included a two-year penalty for 
the same offense by federal officials.100 It is likely that Congress 
intended for extortion to carry a heavy penalty because of the severity 
of the conduct involved. On the other hand, bribery, while warranting 
culpability, does not rise to the level of extortion and should not carry 
the same penalty. 
The Court’s failure to heed Congress’s intent has allowed for 
federal prosecutorial overreach.101 Federal prosecutors consistently 
seek to prosecute state and local corruption,102 but they are rightfully 
 
 93. Id. at 1439 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 
(2000)). 
 94. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). 
 95. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1439 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 96. Both 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012) and 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012) explicitly criminalize state and 
local bribery. On the other hand, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) specifically applies only to federal public 
officials. As such, Congress knew exactly how to criminalize state and local bribery if it so 
intended. 
 97. Compare the language of 18 U.S.C. § 872, which criminalizes extortion by the federal 
official, but not the payor, with 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012), which criminalizes both parties to a bribe 
involving a public official. Evans, 504 U.S. at 283–84 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 98. Charles N. Whitaker, Note, Federal Prosecution of State and Local Bribery: 
Inappropriate Tools and the Need for a Structured Approach, 78 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1617 (1992). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Congress, of course, could step in and amend the Hobbs Act or enact a federal statute that 
specifically targets state and local bribery to resolve the misinterpretation. See e.g., Eliason, supra 
note 79. 
 102. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATION 
OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 2014 at 16 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/ 
798261/download (listing several cases outlining federal prosecution of state and local officials for 
corruption crimes). 
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subject to statutory constraints.103 The Court in Evans interpreted the 
Hobbs Act to allow prosecutors to bypass such constraints and 
prosecute conduct not explicitly proscribed by statute. With renewed 
support from Ocasio, federal prosecutors will undoubtedly continue to 
charge state and local officials in a manner that is inconsistent with a 
plain reading of the Hobbs Act. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
It was unnecessary for the Supreme Court to expand the reach of 
federal prosecutors by interposing bribery into the Hobbs Act. Surely 
Congress would have expressly included bribery in the language of 
the act if that were the conduct it sought to punish. However, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the Hobbs Act to include bribery and it has 
not faltered in its interpretation. Unfortunately for potential petitioners 
seeking to overturn Evans, the Court seems to have dug its heels in 
with Ocasio. The number of Supreme Court Justices who are likely to 
get on board with a re-examination of the holding in Evans, likely 
including Justice Thomas and Justice Breyer, is simply too small to be 
effective at this time. It is also unlikely that Congress will step in to 
resolve the misinterpretation in light of the almost twenty-five years 
of radio silence since Evans was decided. 
As evidenced by Ocasio, the Hobbs Act will continue to function 
as a powerful tool that allows federal prosecutors to charge federal and 
state officials, not only with the crimes listed in the statute, but also 
with a crime that has since become roughly equivalent. 
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